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Short  and  long-run  inequalities  and  income  stability  among  households 
with  male  heads  are  measured  and  analyzed  using  the  Panel  Study  of  Income 
Dynamics  for  1969-81.  The  results  suggest  short-run  inequalities  are 
increasing  over  the  period  with  fluctuations.  These  fluctuations  contain 
transitory  components  which  can  be  eliminated  by  smoothing  of  the  data. 
Long-run  measures  are  less  subject  to  fluctuations  and,  therefore,  provide  a 
better  measure  of inequality.  They show a decrease  in inequality  in the early 
periods  but  increases  after  the mid-1970's.  Several  aggregator  functions  are 
used  to  compute  "permanent  income"  variables  for  the  long-run  measures  of 
inequality  and stability.  The measures  are decomposed  to reflect  differences 
in age,  education,  and race.  They are decomposed  also  into groups  which  are 
free  of  such  group  characteristics.  Education  has  the  most  important 
influence  on  inequality.  Stability  profiles  indicate,  furthermore,  most  of 
the  reduction  in  inequality  in  the  early  periods  among  households  with  male 
heads  has  been  within  particular  groups.  Reductions  across  groups  are 
minimal. I.  INTRODUCTION 
There  are  many  studies  suggesting  an  increase  in  the  inequality  in 
earnings  among  U.S.  males  over  the past  20 years.  For  examples,  see  Dooley 
and  Gottschalk  (1984),  Henle  and  Ryscavage  (1980),  Plotnick  (1982),  Mincer 
(1974),  Freeman  (1979),  and  Welch  (1979).  There  is  a  range  of  hypotheses 
offered  to  explain  this  increase.  No  agreement  has  emerged,  however,  as  to 
the nature  and cause  of this phenomenon.  Generalized  Entropy  (GE) frameworks 
are employed  in this  study with  the expectation  that  their  ability  to permit 
decomposition  provides  a more  appropriate  framework  of  analysis.  Inequality 
and mobility  measures  are employed  and applied  to the Michigan  Panel  Study  on 
Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  for  the period  1969-81.  GE  permits  investigation  of 
the nature  of these changes  in inequality  components  which  are group  specific 
(age, education,  and race)  as well  as components  which  are free of such group 
characteristics. 
A  framework  introduced  in Maasoumi  (1986) and Maasoumi-Zandvakili  (1990) 
is  used  to  provide  an  appropriate  income  aggregation  procedure  so  that 
measurement  of long-run  inequality  and income stability  is now possible.  Most 
studies  look  at  a  "snap-shot"  of  the  short-run  distributions  of  income  and 
make  judgments  regarding  the  changes  in  inequality.  More  importantly,  this 
"snap-shot"  approach  allows  no  analysis  of  the  transitory  components  in 
short-run  inequalities.  A  stability  measure  provides,  an accurate  picture  of 
the degree  of equalization  taking place over time among and across households. 
Mobility  increases  the  degree  of  equalization  among  and  across  households. 
Decomposition  of  stability  profiles  into  the  "between-group"  and  "average 
within-group"  components  and  a  measure  of  group  stability  enhances  the 
understanding  of the nature  of changes  in equalization. 
The  framework  for  the  measurement  of  short-run  inequalities,  long-run 
inequality,  income  stability,  and  their decomposition  is found  in section  II. 
2 Section  III summarizes  the overall patterns  found.  Sections  IV, V, VI contain 
discussions  of  life cycle  implications,  human  capital  considerations,  and  the 
factors  of  race  and  ethnicity  with  appropriate  decompositions.  Conclusions 
appear  in section VII. 
II.  THE MODEL 
Individual  or household  income  is a measure 
is measured  normally  for a specific  time period. 
only a  "snapshot"  of an  attribute  (income) which 
changes.  Consider  the  two  individuals  with  the 
[8, 41  in two consecutive  periods.  The  observed 
period  has  not  changed  although  the  individuals 
in the distribution  of income.  Short-run measures 
of  economic  well-being.  It 
Such a short-run  measure  is 
is hard  to define  and which 
distributions  of  [4, 81  and 
\ 
relative  inequality  in each 
have  traded  their  positions 
would  show no equalization. 
The  long-run  or multi-period  inequality  has  declined,  however,  as can be  seen 
with  a  simple  linear  aggregation  of  incomes  over  the  two periods  which  will 
produce  perfect  equality.  Aggregation  techniques  are  subjective,  of  course, 
but  the  approach  used  in  this  study  has  the  flexibility  to  allow  an 
exploration  of the area between  the two extremes  sketched  above. 
Income  aggregation  functions  are  used  as  measures  of  "long-run"  income 
(utility).  These  functions  provide  weights  for income  at different  points  in 
time.  The  aggregate  incomes  have  "distributions"  which  are  close  to  the 
annual  income  distributions.  The notion  of closeness  follows Maasoumi  (1986) 
which  is based  on  information  theory.  This  approach  provides  an  appropriate 
interpretation  for  many 
linear, and Cobb Douglas. 
Let  Yit  denote  the 
. . . , T.  Allow  Si - Si(Yil 
of  the  popular  utility  functions  including  CES, 
income  of  household  i -  1,  .  .  ..N in  period  t -  1, 
) .  .  .  .  Yit)  to represent  aggregate  income such that: 
'i -  [Z&Y;:  ]-1'P  /3#0,  -1  (1) -7rY 
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%  P-0  (1') 
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where  4 can be regarded  as income weight  for each period,  such that C 4  = 1. 
tt 
The constant  elasticity  of substitution  of  income over  time  is o = l/(1 + p). 
The  family  of  measures  employed  to  compute  inequality  is  the  Generalized 
Entropy  (GE).  The  Generalized  Entropy  measures  of  inequality  satisfy  the 
"fundamental  welfare  axioms" 
(1983).  Maasoumi  (1986) 
measures  using  the aggregate 
,  and a GE approach  as given 
17(S) = Ci  [(NS;)l+7-l] 
exemplified  in Cowell  and Kuga  (1981) and.Foster 
develops  multi-period  or  attribute  inequality 
income 
*  N 
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I  and  I  These 
0  -1 
are  the  well  known  Theil  (1967)  information  indices. 
measures  include  monotonic  transformations  of  measures  proposed  by  Atkinson 
(1970). 
To  measure  stability  over  M  I  T  periods,  the  corresponding  long-run 
inequality  17(S),  and  a  weighted  average  of  short-run  inequalities, 
CtQt17(Yt),  are  calculated.  A  measure  of  stability  (mobility)  over  the  M 
periods  is derived  from the following  relationship: 
54  -  17(S)/~pt17(Yt)  (3) For some Si, the restriction  0 I PLM  5 1 holds  for all convex measures  I(*) and 
Ctat  -  1.  This  restriction  holds  for  other  functions  following  the 
propositions  1 and 2 in Maasoumi  (1986) such that  -7 =  (1+/3). Definition  (3) 
generalizes  Shorrochs  (1978).  As M + T,  the profile  generated  by RM  reflects 
changes  in  the  distribution  of  income  (stability).  The  choice  of  17(S) 
affects,  of course,  the computation  of 
Ek* 
Inequality  measures  vary  in their 
sensitivity  to  transfers  in the distribution  of  income.  In order  to  analyze 
this  sensitivity,  as well  as  the  role  of  aggregation  method,  we  use  several 
inequality measures  and aggregation  methods. 
The usefulness  of  additive  decomposition  property  of Generalized  Entropy 
measures  in  this  context  is  discussed  in  Maasoumi-Zandvakili  (1990).  For 
example  Theil's  second measure  of inequality  can be decomposed  to: 
R 
I .l  = I ,(S.) +  X P_I_,(Sr) 
-1  r=l  *  -I 
where  P  is 
r 
is  the  rth 
first  term 
inequality. 
the population  share of the rth group, r - 1  .  .  .  . R.  Note  that S' 
group's  share  vector  and  S.  is  the  vector  of  group  means.  The 
on  the  right  is  the  "between-group"  component  of  the  measured 
The  second  term  is  a  weighted  average  of  "within-group" 
inequalities.  This  measure  of  stability  can  be  decomposed  also  into  the 
"between-group"  and  "average  within-group"  component  such  that RM  = R,,  + Rw. 
Group  specific  stability  profile  can be  computed  as  well  from  the  following 
expression: 
RW - 17(SW)/Ctatr17(Y~)  (5) 
where  the income share of the ith household  in the rth group at time t is Ytri 
with  the relative weights  given as a 
tr' 
Similarly  0 I R" I 1. 
5 III. THE OVERALL PATTERNS 
One of the basic  structural  changes  in the U.S.  labor market has been  the 
rise  in  the  labor  force  participation  ratio  of women  in general  and  married 
women  in particular.  Consequently,  inequality  among households  headed  by men 
has to be studied  in the context of the family.  The data are derived  from the 
1776 families whose head  is male  in Panel Study on Income Dynamics  (PSID) from 
1969-81.  Total  Family  Income  includes head  of household's  earned  income  such 
as  wages  and  salaries,  business  income,  interest,  and  dividends;  transfer 
payments  such  as unemployment  workers  compensation,  aid  to  the  families  with 
dependent  children,  social  security,  and  retirement  benefits;  other  income 
such as child  support  and spouse's  income.  Real Total  Family  Income  (TFI) is 
obtained  using  the  current  price  index.  The  real  Per  Capita  Family  Incomes 
(PCFI)  is  the base  for  this  study.  Since households  pool  incomes,  PCFI  is a 
better  indicator  of  the  economic  well-being  of  the  family  than  Total  Family 
Income,  as established  in Kakwani  (1984) and Rosen  (1984).  Results  based  on 
TFI  are  available  from  the  author,  and  they  are  used  in  making  some 
comparisons  in this paper.  In order  to compute  aggregate  income,  three  types 
of weights  for annual  incomes  are used-  -Equal Income Weights  (EIW), Principal 
Component  Weights  (PCW), and Mean  of  Income Weights  (MIW).  See Maasoumi  and 
Zandvakili  (1990)  for  details.  The  results  are  invariant  generally  with 
respect  to the weights  used.  The results based on MIW are presented. 
The overall  results based  on PCFI are presented  in table 1, which  reports 
short-run  inequalities  Ir(Yt),  long-run  inequality  Iy(S)  and  income  stability 
RM* 
As we move  from 1969 to 1981, the number  of periods  over which  Iy(S) and 
RM are calculated  is increasing  from 1 to 13.  The  long-run  measures  in later 
years,  of  course,  aggregate  more  observations  than  the  earlier  years.  Four 
measures  of  short-run  inequality  are  given  in  the  top  section  of  Table  1, 
denoted by  -7 - v =  (2.0, 1.0, 0.5, 0.0).  The choice  of y reflects  a measure 
6 of  the  degree  of  sensitivity  to  transfers  at  each  income  level.  As  7 
increases  more  weight  is  attached  to  the  transfers  at  the  lower  end  of  the 
distribution  and  less  to  those  at  the  top.  With  7  -  -2  the  short-run 
inequalities  are most  pronounced  and become  smaller  as 7 +  0.  An  increasing 
trend  in  short-run  inequality  is observed  over  the  13 years.  These  results 
may  be  distorted,  however,  because  of  the existence  of  transitory  components 
in  income.  Any  judgment  regarding  the  status  of  short-run  inequality  among 
households  headed  by males must be tentative.  Most of the existing  literature 
looks  at  these  annual  results  and  offers  hypotheses  to  explain  the  rise  in 
inequality  among males.  To explain  the rising  trend of 
(in  our  case  households  headed  by  a  male),  however, 
inequality must be employed. 
Long-run  measures  of  inequality  among  households 
presented  in  the mid-section  of  table  1.  The  results 
\ 
inequality  among males 
measures  of  long-run 
headed  by  males  are 
are  uniformly  smaller 
than the short-run  observations  with  the exception  of 1970 when  7 -  -2.  This 
is  the  result  of  the  smoothing  of  transitory  components  through  aggregation 
and  is  invariant  with  respect  to  the  type  of  aggregation  function  used. 
Long-run  inequality  among  households  headed  by  males  decreases  up  to  the 
mid-1970's  and  increases  for  the  remainder  of  the  period.  A  question  that 
remains  is why  the initial fall in the long-run  inequality was not sustained. 
The entrance  of married women  into the labor force in the late 1960's and 
early  1970's may have  caused  the earnings  of these households  to approach  the 
mean.  Most  married  women  entered  the secondary  labor market  with  low wages. 
The  recession  of  1974-75  also  may  have  had  a  differential  impact  among 
families.  The  impact  of  business  fluctuations  is  not  uniform  across  all 
households.  Those  with  low  skills  and  seniority  tend  to  get  affected  more 
severely.  There  is  some  evidence,  however,  suggesting  the  rate  of  male  non 
and  partial  participation  in  the  labor  force  increases  across  all  ages  and affects  the distribution  of income as  suggested by Parson  (1980).  Changes  in 
the  rate  of  participation  could  be  attributed  also  to  factors  such  as  age, 
education,  race, and institutional  changes  in the welfare  system. 
Income  stability  measures  appear  at  the bottom  of  tables  1.  Recall  the 
values  of 
RM 
range  between  zero  and  one.  As  RM  +  0,  the  distribution  of 
income moves  toward equality. 
the mid-1970's;  however,  there 
below which  it is difficult  to 
1980's  but  it  is  sensitive 
Comparing  figures  1 and  2,  it 
For -y  <  -2, some equalization  takes place until 
seems  to be  some permanent  level of  inequality 
move.  For 7 - -2, equalization  continues  in-to 
to  the  definition  of  income  (TFI  vs  PCFI). 
\ 
is evident  that more  equalization  occurs  using 
TFI  as  the  measure  of  economic  well  being.  Decomposition  is  necessary  to 
better  understand  these patterns. 
IV.  THE LIFE CYCLE IMPLICATIONS 
The  measures  of  short  and  long-run  inequality  and  income  stability  are 
decomposed  over  five groups,  defined by  the age of the male head  of household 
in  1969.  The  "between-group,"  and  "average  within-group"  components  of  the 
overall  inequality,  as  well  as  group  inequality  and  stability  measures  are 
determined.  Due to our decomposition  the number  of observations  in each group 
is not  large.  However,  this should not cause concern  since  I am using  actual 
household  data  and not  grouped  aggregated  data.  This  approach  uses  far more 
observations  (information)  than  the  grouping  approach:  i.e.  Cowell  and Mehta 
(1982).  The  number  of  observations  in my  smallest  group  is  far  larger  than 
the  number  of  groups  in  most  studies.  The  grouping  approach  is  generally 
sensitive  to the number  of groups used, and the number  of observations  in each 
group.  This  suggests  the cut-offs  for each group play  a very  important  role. 
The  choice  for  cut-offs  is  normative  and  it  influences  the  measured 
inequality.  Furthermore,  the  grouping  approach  assumes  the  inequality  to  be 
zero  within  each  group.  Kakwani  (1976)  demonstrated  that  this  leads  to substantial  underestimation  of measured  inequality. 
The  purpose  of  the  decomposition  and  the  grouping  is  to  investigate 
inequality  and  changes  in  the  distribution  of  income  among  and  across  age 
groups.  The measures  for each group are continuous  for the thirteen  years  of 
the study.  This permits  drawing  inferences  as to life-cycle  patterns.  Given 
that the individuals  in each age group are roughly at the same points  in their 
life-cycle,  inequality  between  groups  reflects  the 
patterns  over  the  life-cycle.  Inferences  are  drawn, 
influence  of aspects  of the life-cycle  pattern  such as 
wealth  and human  capital  of the older, more experienced 
among groups  is not  the result  of life-cycle  patterns, 
influence  of  earning 
therefore,  as  to  the 
returns  on accumulated 
groups.  If inequality 
there would have  to be 
group  (age)  specific  factors  at work.  The  relative  influence  of  inequality 
within  age  groups  and  between  age  groups  on  the  overall  level  of  inequality 
can  be  determined.  Is  the  overall  level  of  inequality  the  result  of 
inequality  among  individuals  in  the  same  age  group  or  in  different  age 
groups? 
Decompositions  by  age  of  annual,  short-run  inequalities  is  provided  in 
Table  2.  For considerations  of space,  results  are shown  for only every  other 
year  (odd) in the tables  in the rest  of  the paper.  The  following  inferences 
can be drawn: 
(i)  The  "average  within-group"  inequality  is the  dominant  component  of 
the  overall  inequality.  It  has  a  rising  trend.  This  trend  is 
observed  regardless  of the inequality measure  used. 
(ii)  The  "between-group"  component  also  is  rising  in  each  of  the  13 
years.  This rise is greatest with -y  <  -2. 
(iii)  Short-run  inequalities  for  each  of  the  five  age  groups  increased. 
The youngest  age group generally has the least short-run  inequality, 
and but  increases  generally  as the age of the group increases.  This reflects  different  returns on deferred  investment  in human  capital. 
It would  appear  that patterns  in life-cycles  are less important  in influencing 
the overall  level of inequality  than the factors  shaping  the inequality  among 
individuals  within  the  groups.  Age,  per  se  is not  a  strong  explanation  of 
inequality. 






observations  can be made: 
Since  the  transitory  components  have  been  smoothed  out,  a  rise  in 
the  "between  group"  inequality  is  observed.This  is  seen  easily  by 
comparing  the short 
in Tables  2 and  3. 
and long-run  "between-group"  components‘for  ,198l 
The  "greater"  the smoothing  (aggregation),  the 
larger  the  "between-group"  inequality  measure  and  its  relative 
influence  on the overall measure. 
Inequality  among  households  headed  by  males  decreases  as  the  early 
years  of  the period  are  aggregated  until  the  mid-1970's.  Further 
aggregation  produces  increases  for  the  remainder  of  the  periods. 
The  measured  long-run  inequality  for  each  of  the  age  groups  gets 
smaller  as y + 0. 
Inequality  is  smallest  for  the youngest  age  group  and  largest  for 
two  oldest  age  groups.  The  suggested  reason  was  provided  as  we 
discussed  the decompositions  of short-run  inequality. 
The  stability  profiles  in  Table  4  indicate  most  equalization  has 
occurred  within  age  groups  with  minimal  equalization  among  age 
groups. 
The rise  in long-run  inequality  is often attributed  to a decline  in male 
participation  in  the  labor market.  A  rise  in real  wages,  however,  may  have 
caused  the age/earning  profiles  to shift upward  with  an  income  effect  greater 
than the substitution  effect,  resulting  in fewer work hours  for some and early 
10 retirement  for  others.  The  growth  in  the  coverage  and benefits  from  Social 
Security  and  private  pension  plans  may  have  contributed  to  a decline  in  the 
labor force participation  rate by  those  in the oldest  age group.  Discussions 
in  Blinder,  Gorden,  and  Wise  (1980),  and  Burtless  and  Moffitt  (1984)  are 
helpful  on this point. 
Smaller  participation  in  the  labor  force  by  the  youngest  age  group 
(18-29)  is a life-cycle  phenomenon.  Greater  investment  in human  capital  by 
this group  reduces  labor  force participation  and increases  the expectation  of 
higher  future  earnings.  This may be viewed  as an optimal  time  to take  on  the 
investment  so  as  to  minimize  the  opportunity  cost  of  time  and  maximize'the 
duration  in which  higher  returns  are  received.  When  the  individuals  who  do 
invest  in human  capital  enter  the labor market,  their  increased  earnings  will 
cause overall  and intra-group  inequality  to rise for their lifetime. 
The  observed  dispersion  in  household  earnings  is  believed  by  most 
researchers  to  arise  from  age  differences  among  primary  earners  in  the 
household.  Our  findings  suggest  strongly,  however,  that the degree  of  income 
inequality  over  the  life  cycle  among  households  will  be  less  than  those 
indicated  by  cross-section  data  for a particular  year.  Thus,  "within-group" 
inequality  is the dominant  factor. 
V.  HUMAN  CAPITAL  IMPLICATIONS 
It  is  an  accepted  view  that  individuals  invest  in  human  capital 
anticipating  higher  future  earnings.  The  level  of  education  needs  to  be 
considered,  therefore,  in investigating  inequality  among households.  The data 
base  is decomposed  into four education  groups.  Again,  the overall  inequality 
is divided  into  intra  and  inter-group  components  in both  short  and  long-run 
measures.  The highest  level  of education  attained  by  the men who were  heads 
of  households  in  1975  is  the  basis  for  the  decomposition.  The  four 
educational  groups  are:  (1) up  to 11th grade,  (2) a high  school  diploma  or a 
11 high  school  diploma  plus non-academic  training;  (3) college with  no degree 
college with  a BA but no  advanced  degree; and  (4) college with  an advanced 
professional  degree. 
or 
or 
As  was  the  case  with  the  age  decomposition,  overall  short-run 
inequalities  have  increased  generally  but  with  some  variations  over  each  of 
the 13 years.  The decompositions  of the overall  short-run  inequalities  based 
on education  are provided  in Table 5.  The following  conclusions  can be drawn: 
(i)  The "between-group"  component  contributes  a larger proportion  to the 
overall  inequality  than was found in the age decomposition.  Also  it 
has  a  rising  trend.  The  "within-group"  component,  however, 
constitutes  the  larger  proportion  of  the overall  inequality.  Note 
that the  "between-group"  component  has  increased  from  15 percent  in 
1969  to  23  percent  in  1981  of  the  total  inequality  when  -y  =  -.5. 
This  is a sizable  rise  although  the comparable  increase  in  the age 
decomposition  was 1% in 1969 to 12% in 1981. 
(ii>  The level  of short-run  inequality  among  families whose  head  had  the 
lowest  level  of  education  is  significantly  higher  than  for  other 
groups  and decreases with  the level of education.  This results  from 
the  sensitivity  of  the  measures  to  many  exceptionally  low  income 
levels associated  with some low education  levels. 
This  evidence  suggests  some  of  the existing  inequality  among  households 
headed  by men  is the result  of  the differences  in the level  of education.  A 
look  at  the  household  earnings  in  the  long-run  (table  6),  where  transitory 
variations  are  reduced,  is useful  in  order  to  determine  whether  this  result 
holds.  The following  general observations  are made: 
(i)  The  proportion  of  the  overall  inequality  attributable  to 
"between-group"  inequality  increases  from  short-run  inequality  to 
long-run  inequality.  Also  it has a rising  trend over the 13 years. 
12 (ii)  The  overall  inequality  decreases  through 
aggregation.  Further  aggregation  produces 
the  period.  It  is  highest  among  those 
education. 
the mid-1970's  because  of 
increases  for  the rest  of 
with  the  least  amount  of 
The  major  source  of  inequality  in  the  long-run  is  within  educational 
groups,  repeating  the short-run  results.  This pattern  is observed  regardless 
of the aggregation  function  and weights.  This  suggests  other  factors  such as 
choice  of occupation  within  each  education  category  may be  a major  source  of 
earnings  differential.  For  each  education  group,  there  is a fall  in  long-run 
inequality  followed  by  a rise  in  the  remaining  periods.  The  timing‘of  this 
pattern,  however,  differs  among the education  groups  and is somewhat  sensitive 
to  the  type  of  aggregation  function  used.  Variations  in  earnings  are  large 
for those with  low education  levels some with very  low incomes.  Those with  an 
advanced  or  professional  degree  tend  to  have  the  lowest  level  of  long-run 
inequality.  This  is expected  since variations  in the earnings  for specialized 
degrees  are rather  small  (in relative  terms). 
The  decomposition  of  the  stability  profile  into  "between-group"  and 
"average  within-group"  components  (Table  7)  reveals  the  latter  is  a  larger 
proportion  of overall  inequality  and  the stability  decreases  as  the number  of 
years  aggregated  increase.  The  former,  however,  has  a  rising  trend  for 
aggregation  in the earlier  years but becomes  horizontal  after  the mid-1970's. 
This  suggests  equalization  takes  place  within  each  educational  group  and 
between-group  equalization  is nonexistent. 
It  is  evident  the  level  of  human  capital  attained  is  an  important 
determinant  of  the  distribution  of  earnings.  Some  variations  in  income, 
however,  can  be  related  to  individual  differences  in  post-school  training, 
restrictions  of  entry  into  occupations,  etc.  The  results  of  the  age 
decomposition  are  replicated  for  educational  groupings.  The  within-group 
13 inequality  is  the  dominant  component  of  overall  inequality,  but  the 
between-group  component  is increasing. 
VI.  RACIAL AND ETHNICITY  COMPONENTS 
Sizable  income differential  among households  has been  attributed  to race 
and ethnicity  of the family.  Decompositions  based  on the race or ethnicity  of 
the male  heads  of households  is fruitful  in examining  this proposition.  The 
total population  of 1776 households  headed by a male are decomposed  into white 
and  non-white.  The  white  category  includes  74  percent  of  the  total 
households. 
The  short-run  results  are  provided  in Table  8  from  which  the  following 
generalizations  may be made: 
(i)  The  "within-group"  inequality  is  the  dominating  factor  in  the 
overall  level  of  inequality  and  it  has  a  rising  trend.  The 
"between-group"  component  is  stable  and  its  share  of  total 
inequality  has  fallen  over  the years.  For  example  for y <  -2, the 
"between-group"  component  was  around  14  percent  in  1969  and  8 
percent  in 1981.  This compares with  increases  from 1 percent  to 12 
percent  and 15 percent  to 23 percent  over the same period 
and education  decompositions  respectively. 
(ii) The  "within"  group  inequalities  show  a rising  trend  for 
of  households.  The  short-run  inequality  for  each  year 
among non-white  than white households. 
There  appears  to  be  decrease  in  across-group  inequality  in  the 
in the age 
both  types 
is  greater 
short-run. 
Since  the proportion  of  total  inequality  accounted  for by  inequality  between 
the  groups  has  fallen,  it  is  tempting  to  conclude  non-white  families  gained 
ground  in some sense,  compared  to white  families.  Unfortunately,  the picture 
is not as encouraging  if one would  consider  the position  of these  families  in 
the  long-run.  Table  9  provides  the  long-run  inequality  results  with  the 
14 decompositions.  It follows  that: 
(i)  The  "within-group"  inequality 
of  the  overall  inequality 
mid-1970's  and  an  increase 
still  constitutes  a  larger  proportion 
but  exhibits  a  decrease  until  the 
for  the  rest  of  the  period.  The 
"between-group"  component  is  stable.  Since  short-run  overall 
measure  increases  while  the  long-run  decreases  and  then  increases, 
the  share  of  total  inequality  accounted  for  by  "between-group" 
inequality  is larger  than observed  in the short-run. 
(ii) There  is  no  clear  trend  on  the  direction  of  the  "between-group" 
component.  Its  share  and  direction  is  sensitive  to  the  choice  of 
the aggregation  function used. 
(iii) The  long-run  inequality  among  non-whites  is  greater  than  those  of 
white households. 
There  appears  to be  a new  class  of non-whites  in the U.S.  economy:  Asian  and 
to  some  extent  Latin0  immigrants  who  are  successful  on  the  one  hand  and 
non-middle  class  black  and  other  non-whites  with  decreasing  prospects  on  the 
other.  This contributes  to the rise in inequality  among non-white  families  in 
the  long-run.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  gains  for  the  non-whites  are 
transitory  in nature.  The stability profiles  and their decompositions  support 
this observation. 
Most  studies  that have  examined  this  issue have  made  observations  based 
on  single  period  data.  For examples  see Smith  and Welch  (1979)  and  Chiswick 
(1974).  The results  of this study suggest  that a reexamination  of policies  to 
combat  across  race  income  inequality  is in order.  The current  policies  based 
on  affirmative  action  programs  have  produced  no  discernible  results.  New 
innovative  policies  need  to  be  put  into  place  if  we  are  serious  about 
correcting  the  current  crisis.  Examination  of  such  policies  is  beyond  the 
scope of this paper.  As  shown in table  10, the equalization  has been  within 
15 groups while  the cross-equalization  has been minimal.  One can speculate  as to 
the reasons  for  such patterns.  Of  course,  these  results  hold  to  the  extent 
that PSID represents  the population  demographics  of the U.S.  economy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  provided  a  better  evaluation  of  the  status  of  the 
inequality  among  male-headed  households.  Short-run  inequalities,  long-run 
inequality,  and  income  stability  for  male  headed  households  were  presented. 
The  upward  bias  of  short-run  inequalities  due  to  transitory  components  are 
shown  to be  of  importance.  A  framework  to measure  long-run  inequality  with 
decompositions  which  is  free  of  such  transitory  components  is  employed  to 
further  enhance  an understanding  of  these  changes.  This  provided  us  with  a 
better  picture  of inequality  among male headed households. 
It  was  shown  that  inequality  among  households  headed  by  males  has 
increased,  after  a brief  decrease  in the early  1970's.  The  decomposition  of 
overall  inequality  and  the  stability  profiles  based  on  age,  education,  and 
race  provided  us  with  valuable  insights.  It  was  shown  that  the  "average 
within-group"  components  are the major  source  of inequality  regardless  of  the 
choice  of  decomposition,  but  the  "between-group"  components  are  significant 
especially  in  the  long-run.  Thus,  life-cycle,  education,  and  race  are 
important  sources  of  inequality  in the long-run.  The decompositions  show  the 
"between group"  components  based  on education  constitute  a sizable portion  of 
the overall  inequality  in the long-run.  The stability profiles  indicate  there 
have  been  short-term  transitory  changes  in  inequality  among  male-headed 
households.  There  seems  to  be  a  permanent  level  of  inequality  which  was 
revealed when  the profiles  became  flat with 7 < -2.  Most of the equalizations 
are  shown  to  occur  within  the  groups.  Equalization  across  groups  has  been 
minimal. 
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FIGURE  1 MEASURE OF  INCOME STABILJ'I'YTFI 
1969-81,  MEN HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BASED ON 
MEAN OF INCONE WEIGHTS  / 
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FIGURE .  2  bfEASURE  OF INCOME STABILITY  PCFI 
1969-81,MEN LIEAD  OF IiOUSE1iOLD  BASED ON 




1969-81  m  -  FAKfIX  Iw(xME,  MPI  HEAD OF  -mm 
INamE- 
ovmALLEElwEEN  WmiIN  Mm29  3urQ39  4cm49  5om59 
v-  2.0 
1969  1.000  0.005  0.995  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1969-71  0.907  0.006  0.901  0.807  0.882  0.922  0.961 
1969-73  0.873  0.007  0.865  0.778  0.850  0.890  0.945 
1969-75  0.822  0.009  0.813  0.734  0.808  0.844  0.885 
1969-77  0.773  0.011  0.761  0.695  0.763  0.802  0.828 
1969-79  0.721  0.014  0.707  0.651  0.719  0.762  0.766 
1969-81  0.669  0.019  0.651  0.641  0.673  0.715  0.698 













1.000  0.011  0.989  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
0.912  o.ol2  0.901  ( 0.823  0.891  0.926  0.951  0.921 
0.882  o.ou  0.869  0.794  0.864  0.899  0.933  0.873 
0.851  0.016  0.835  0.760  0.833  0.873  0.898  0.847 
0.824  \  0.021  0.803  '0.733  0.809  0.855  0.865  0.798 
0.804  0.030  0.774  0.713  0.794  0.841  0.828  0.802 
0.780  0.044  0.737  0.697  0.773  0.822  0.784  0.794 
1.000  0.012  0.988  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
0.917  0.013  0.904  0.833  0.896  0.929  0.955 
0.890  0.014  0.877  0.808  0.875  0.904  0.939 








1969-77  0.842  0.022  0.820  0.761  0.831  0.872  0.877 
1969-79  0.828  0.033  0.796  0.744  0.823  0.861  0.842 
1969-81  0.8l.3 
v-  0.0 
1969  1.000 
1969-71  0.9u 
1969-73  0.888 
1969-75  0.861 
1969-77  0.847 
1969-79  0.833 
1969-81  0.822 
0.050  0.763  0.746  0.803  0.848  0.804 
o.ol.3  0.987  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
o.ol3  0.902  0.836  0.896  0.925  0.953 
o.ol.3  0.875  0.812  0.878  0.900  0.933 
0.017  0.845  0.782  0.855  0.879  0.899 
0.021  0.826  0.780  0.844  0.877  0.871 
0.031  0.802  0.765  0.838  0.863  0.833 
















SS  1776  316  428  512  333  187 
TABr.E5 
1969-81  PER m  FApIllly  INCOME,  MEN HEAD OF HXEWXD 
er=Jw 
ovEmLLw  WImIN  0-1l.m  l25tmmADvDEG 
VL  2.0 
1969  0.796  0.060  0.736  0.901  0.340  0.289  0.196 
1971  0.730  0.080  0.650  0.638  0.494  0.379  0.278 
1973  0.637  0.075  0.562  0.592  0.319  0.368  0.261 
1975  0.817  0.092  0.725  0.687  0.531  0.464  0.251 
1977  0.984  0.083  0.901  0.919  0.556  0.580  0.313 
1979  1.212  0.088  1.124  1.104  0.758  0.722  0.402 
1981  1.522  0.119  1.403  1.320  0.870  0.736  0.592 
v-  1.0 
1969  0.340  0.058  0.283  0.367  0.222  0.224  0.168 
1971  0.376  0.077  0.299  0.349  0.262  0.269  0.2l3 
1973  0.363  0.072  0.290  0.351  0.239  0.261  0.195 
1975  0.422  0.087  0.335  0.386  0.295  0.319  0.207 
1977  0.467  0.080  0.387  0.488  0.294  0.341  0.256 
1979  0.497  0.085  0.4u  0.520  0.338  0.331  0.270 
1981  0.578  O.ll3  0.464  0.579  0.381  0.378  0.334 
*  0.5 
1969  0.306  0.057  0.249  0.333  0.208  0.218  0.164 
1971  0.341  0.076  0.265  0.315  0.248  0.257  0.201 
1973  0.331 
1975  0.380 
1977  0.419 
1979  0.426 
1981  0.489 
v-  0.0 
1969  0.305 
1971  0.344 
1973  0.333 
1975  0.382 
1977  0.429 
1979  0.417 
1981  0.480 






0.057  0.247  0.335  0.210 
0.077  0.267  0.312  0.258 
0.072  0.260  0.3u  0.244 
0.086  0.296  0.336  0.274 
0.081  0.348  0.486  0.268 
0.086  0.330  0.444  0.298 
0.115  0.365  0.472  0.334 
0.259  0.318  0.233 
0.293  0.344  0.272 
0.339  0.452  0.268 
0.341  0.453  0.300 





























l969-81pERCAPl!JXFAbELY~,MENHE?iDOF  -mm 
=++mINDsIAIsIy 
ovm?d.Lm  wlxfm  0-llGR  l2GRa3Lr.zEiAIIvDM; 
+  2.0 
1969  0.796  0.060  0.736  0.901  0.340  0.289  0.196 
1969-71  0.667  0.072  0.595  0.655  0.350  0.279  0.198 
ovmALLElimEm  wlmm  o-llca  12GR  ComAwIlEc 
v-  2.0 
1969  1.000  0.075  0.925  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1969-71  0.907  0.098  0.809  0.897  0.891  0.045  0.802 
1969-73  0.873  0.110  0.762  0.854  0.853  0.791  0.756 
1969-75  0.823  0.116  0.707  0.793  0.788  0.730  0.739 
1969-77  0.773  0.114  0.658  0.719  0.744  0.681  0.711 
1969-79  0.721  0.104  0.617  0.658  0.687  0.644  0.672 
1969-73  0.601  0.076  0.525  0.561  0.315  0.279  0.184 




v-  1.0 
1969 
0.605  0.089  0.515  0.515  0.338  0.289 
0.657  0.095  0.562  0.553  0.375  0.308 
0.695  0.101  0.594  0.583  0.377  0.320 
0.184 
0.198 
0.340  0.058  0.283  0.367  0.222 
0.326  0.069  a  '0.257  0.320  0.215 
0.317  0.072  0.246  0.301  0.206 
0.320  0.077  0.242  0.292  0.207 
0.328  0.082  0.246  0.294  0.209 
0.339  0.085  0.253  0.308  0.211 
0.353  0.091  0.262  0.327  0.210 
0.2l.l 
0.224  0.168 
0.209  0.169 
0.211  0.157 
0.2u  0.157 
0.219  0.163 
0.221  0.173 
0.221  0.182 
0.306  0.057  0.249  0.333  0.208  0.218  0.164 
0.296  0.068  0.228  0.290  0.206  0.203  0.167 
0.291  0.071  0.220  0.274  0.200  0.206  0.157 
1969-81 








w  0.5 
0.670  0.097  0.573  0.618  0.628  0.593  0.609 
1.000  0.169  0.831  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
0.912  0.192  0.720  0.902  0.899  0.865  0.839 
0.882  0.199  0.683  0.862  0.861  0.825  0.801 
0.851  0.205  0.646  0.817  0.812  0.784  0.790 
0.824  0.206  0.618  0.763  0.784  0.759  0.775 
0.804  0.203  0.601  0.736  0.749  0.738  0.765 







w  0.5 
1969  1969  1.000  0.187  0.813  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1969-71  0.917  0.211  0.706  0.905  0.907  0.875  0.854 
1969-73  0.891  0.218  0.673  0.867  0.873  0.840  0.818 
1969-75  0.862  0.224  0.638  0.825  0.825  0.805  0.809 
1969-77  0.842  0.223  0.619  0.778  0.803  0.791  0.806 
1969-79  0.828  0.221  0.607  0.762  0.775  0.772  0.803 
1969-81  0.8l.3 0.227  0.586  0.762  0.733  0.730  0.790 
v-  0.0 
1969  1.000  0.188  0.812  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1969-71  0.915  0.212  0.703  0.900  0.910  0.877  0.860 
1969-71 
1969-73 
1969-75  0.294  0.076  0.217  0.267  0.198  0.209  0.157 
1969-77  0.302  0.080  0.222  0.272  0.199  0.218  0.166 
1969-79  0.311  0.083  0.228  0.285  0.201  0.218  0.176 
1969-81  0.324  0.090  0.233  0.303  0.199  0.217  0.187 
v-  0.0 
1969  '0.305  0.057  0.247  0.335  0.210  0.226  0.166 
1969-71  0.296  0.068  0.227  0.286  0.212  0.209  0.171 
1969-73  0.292  0.071  0.221  0.269  0.207  0.212  0.160 
1969-75  0.295  0.076  0.219  0.260  0.203  0.218  0.161 
1969-n  0.306  0.078  0.228  0.275  0.203  0.228  0.176 
1969-73  0.888  0.217  0.671  0.860  0.878  0.845  0.823 
1969-75  0.861  0.222  0.639  0.817  0.830  0.814  0.816 
1969-77  0.847  0.217  0.630  0.784  0.809  0.808  0.827 
1969-79  0.833  0.216  0.618  0.770  0.782  0.786  0.824 
1969-81  0.822  0.227  0.595  0.770  0.746  0.745  0.826 
ss 1770  776  492  392  110 
1969-79  0.313  0.081  0.232  0.288  0.206  0.226  O.i85 
1969-81  0.327  0.090  0.237  0.303  0.203  0.227  0.199 
ss 1770  776  492  392  110 ..:.. 
TAElxx2 
1969-81  m  CXPITA  FAMIulpIcoME,~HEADOFI33usEH3LD 
SHoKr-ms 
ovmALLEcIwEzmwT?HIN  18m29  3cn-o39  4cYm49  5OTO59 
v+.  2.0 
1969  0.793  0.004  0.790  0.312  0.424  0.702  2.005 
1971  0.729  ' 0.005  0.724  0.596  0.580  0.684  1.093 
1973  0.636 
1975  0.8SS 
1977  0.981 
1979  1.211 
1981  1.520 
VI  1.0 
1969  0.340 
1971  0.375 
1973  0.362 
1975  0.422 
1977  0.467 
1979  0.498 
1981  0.578 
VI  0.5 
1969  0.306 
0.011  0.626  0.330  0.418  0.757  0.963 
0.017  0.798  0.482  0.496  0.904  1.195 
0.021  0.960  0.490  0.632  1.088  1.347 
0.047  1.164  0.573  0.767  1.196  1.556 








0.004  0.336  0.225  0.270  0.355  0.448  0.425 
0.005  0.370  (  0.274  0.306  0.369  0.497  0.460 
0.010  0.353  0.244  0.274  0.380  0.468  0.437 
0.014  0.407  :  0.292  0.317  0.417  0.537  0.550 
0.018  0.449  '0.295  0.354  0.461  0.584  0.653 
0.039  0.459  0.303  0.348  0.447  0.649  0.671 
0.067  0.511  0.379  0.388  0.510  0.724  0.643 







1971  0.341  0.005  0.336  0.252  0.284  0.330  0.431 
1973  0.331  0.009  0.321  0.234  0.257  0.338  0.407 
1975  0.380  0.013  0.366  0.275  0.299  0.365  0.464 
1977  0.419  0.017  0.402  0.283  0.329  0.401  0.507 
1979  0.427  0.036  0.391  0.284  0.312  0.375  0.558 
1981  0.490  0.061  0.429  0.366  0.335  0.422  0.648 
v-  0.0 
1969  0.304  0.004  0.301  0.217  0.249  0.309  0.372 
1971  0.344  0.005  0.339  0.254  0.291  0.324  0.424 
1973  0.332  0.009  0.323  0.239  0.261  0.333  0.398 
1975  0.383  0.013  0.370  0.283  0.309  0.358  0.457 
1977  0.429 \  0.016  0.4l.3  0.299  0.340  0.398  0.503 
1979  0.417  0.034  0.384  0.294  0.312  0.357  0.550 









1969-81  PER CAPlTA  FAbULY  maME,  HEN  HEAD  OF fl3(EiEHDLD 
I.J=J=mm 
mERALLEiEIwm  wlTMIN181029  301039  4cm49 
v-  2.0 
1969  0.793  0.004  0.790  0.312  0.424  0.702  2.005 
1969-71  0.665  0.004  0.661  0.353  0.420  0.684  1.3l.2 
1969-73  0.599  0.005  0.594  0.315  0.390  0.646 
1969-75  0.588  0.006  0.582  0.303  0.378  0.651 
1969-77  0.603  0.009  0.595  0.306  0.389  0.670 
1969-79  0.656  o.ou  0.643  0.405  0.424  0.705 
1969-81  0.694  0.019  0.674  0.386  0.453  0.750 
I+  1.0 
1969  0.340  0.004  0.336  0.225  0.270  0.355 
1969-71  0.325  0.004  0.321  0.209  0.250  0.333 
1969-73  0.317  0.005  0.312  0.201  0.245  0.327 
1969-75  0.319  0.006  0.313  0.198  0.244  0.329 
1969-77  0.327  0.008  0.319  0.199  0.249  0.339 
1969-79  0.339  0.012  0.326  0.200  0.254  0.345 
1969-81 








th  0.0 
1969 
1969-71 















0.306  0.004  0.302  0.214  0.250  0.314  0.383  0.378 
0.296  0.004  0.292  0.198  0.233  0.294  0.392  0.379 
0.291  0.004  0.287  0.193  0.232  0.291  0.387  0.371 
0.294  0.006  0.288  0.191  0.234  0.294  0.386  0.388 
0.302  0.008  0.294  0.195  0.239  0.304  0.390  0.411 
0.311  0.012  0.298  0.195  0.243  0.307  0.396  0.449 
0.324  0.020  0.304  0.207  0.248  0.312  0.410  0.467 
0.304  0.004  0.301  0.217  0.249  0.309 
0.296  0.004  0.291  0.201  0.234  0.286 
0.372  0.372 
0.384  0.307 
0.377  0.389 
0.376  0.418 
0.381  0.469 
0.385  0.521 
0.402  0.540 
1969-73  0.292  0.004  0.287  0.196  0.237  0.284 
1969-75  0.295  0.006  0.289  0.195  0.241  0.287 
1969-77  0.306  0.007  0.299  0.205  0.248  0.301 
1969-79  0.313  0.012  0.301  0.206  0.253  0.301 
1969-81  0.327  0.019  0.308  0.227  0.261  0.305 













!X  1776  316  428  512  333  187  SS  1776  316  428  512  333  187 , 
TAEE8 
1969-81  PER  GiPIWi  F?dSLX  INCXXE,  MEN  HEAD  OF  IpxTsEIp31D 
-l=J- 
cYv=uGLBFIwEEN-~NwHITE 
v-  2.0 
1969  0.793  0.054  0.740  0.465  0.936 
1971  0.729  0.056  0.673  0.601  0.6l.3 
1973  0.636  0.044  0.592  0.444  0.686 
1975  0.8l.5 0.044  0.771  0.601  0.864 
1977  0.981  0.041  0.940  0.725  1.076 
I.979  1.2l.l 0.042  1.170  0.866  1.388 
1381  1.520  0.052  1.468  1.041  1.722 
v-  1.0 
1969  0.340  0.046  0.294  0.275  0.348 
1971  0.375  0.047  0.328  0.320  0.352 
1973  0.362  0.038  0.325  0.297  0.400 
1975  0.422  0.038  0.384  0.362  0.444 
1977  0.467  0.03'6  0.431  0.401  0.516 
1979  0.498  0.036  0.462  0.423  0.567 
1981  0.578  0.044  0.534  0.489  0.658 
v=  0.5 
1969  0.306  0.042  0.264  0.254  0.319 
1971  0.341  0.043  0.298  0.295  0.324 
1973  0.331  0.035  0.295  0.280  0.366 
1975  0.380  0.035  0.344  0.336  0.392 
1977  0.419  0.034  0.386  0.370  0.461 
1979  0.427  0.034  0.393  0.373  0.485 
1981  0.490  0.041  0.449  0.428  0.553 
v-  0.0 
1969  0.304  0.040  0.265  0.254  0.325 
1971  0.344  0.041  0.303  0.299  0.329 
1973  0.332  0.033  0.299  0.286  0.370 
1975  0.383  0.033  0.349  0.343  0.383 
1977  0.429  0.032  0.397  0.383  0.472 
1979  0.417  0.032  0.385  0.367  0.479 
1981  0.481  0.038  0.443  0.425  0.542 
SS 1776  1301  475 
z4BE9 
1969-81  PER  CRpma  FN4I3.X  zN(xME,  MEN HEAD  OF ~~PfJw 
==mm 
OvERwBEIwEEwmDn 
v-  2.0 
1969  0.793  0.054  0.740  0.465  0.936 
1969-71  0.665  0.056  0.609  0.460  0.665 
1969-73  0.599  0.054  0.545  0.418  0.592 
1969-75  0.588  0.052  0.537  0.411  0.587 
1969-77  0.603  0.051  0.553  0.423  0.608 
1969-79  0.656  0.053  0.603  0.443  0.682 
1969-81  0.694  0.052  0.642  0.464  0.737 
w  1.0 
1969  0.340  0.046  0.294  0.275  0.348 
1969-71  0.325  0.046  0.279  0.265  0.318 
1969-73  0.317  0.044  0.273  0.257  0.317 
1969-75  0.319  0.042  0.277  0.260  0.325 
1969-77  0.327  0.041  0.286  0.268  0.338 
1969-79  0.339  0.041  0.297  0.277  0.353 
1969-81  0.354  0.042  0.312  0.287  0.380 
v-  0.5 
1969  0.306  0.042  0.264  0.254  0.X.9 
1969-71  0.296  0.043  0.253  0.247  0.292 
1969-73  0.291  0.041  0.250  0.242  0.294 
1969-75  0.294  0.039  0.255  0.246  0.300 
1969-77  0.302  0.037  0.265  0.255  0.314 
1969-79  0.311  0.037  0.274  0.263  0.327 
1969-81  0.324  0.038  0.286  0.273  0.349 
v-  0.0 
1969  0.304  0.040  0.265  0.254  0.325 
1969-71  0.296  0.040  0.256  0.249  0.294 
1969-73  0.292  0.038  0.254  0.246  0.297 
1969-75  0.295  0.036  0.259  0.251  0.299 
1969-77  0.306  0.034  0.272  0.263  0.322 
1969-79  0.3l.3 0.034  0.279  0.269  0.334 
1969-81  0.327  0.035  0.292  0.281  0.352 
S!S  1776  1301  475 TABLE  10 
1969-81  PER  CAPITA  FX4IIX  lXCZZ4E.  MRJ  HRiD  OF ‘I.BxmmID  @lIw) 
































1.000  0.068 
0.907  0.076 
0.873  0.078 
0.822  0.072 
0.773  0.065 
0.721  0.058 





0.824  0.103 
0.804  0.098 
0.780  0.092 
1.000  0.138  0.862  1.000  1.000 
0.917  o.l.32 0.785  0.902  0.907 
0.890  0.125  0.766  0.872  0.883 
0.862  o.u4  0.748  0.841  0.856 
0.842  0.104  0.738  0.821  0.833 
0.828  0.099  0.729  0.807  0.8U 
0.813  0.096  0.718  0.785  0.815 
1.000  o.uo  0.870  1.000  1.000 
0.915  0.123  0.792  0.902  0.905 
0.888  O.ll5  0.773  0.872  0.884 
0.861  0.105  0.756  0.844  0.856 
0.847  0.095  0.752  0.830  0.844 
0.833  0.090  0.744  0.816  0.027 












1.000  1.000 
0.885  0.901 
0.848  0.860 
0.794  0.803 
0.743  0.743 
0.699  0.670 
0.642  0.638 
0.866  1.000  1.000 
0.783  0.897  0.901 
0.759  0.862  o.n?l 
0.739  0.826  0.841 
0.721  0.798  0.808 
0.706  0.779  0.777 
0.689  0.748  0.773 
SS 1776  DO1  475 